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1The Impact of Channel Function Performance on
Buyer-Seller Relationships in Marketing Channels
ABSTRACT
Distributors, across sectors and countries, are faced by the threat of disintermediation.  In
many industries, horizontal consolidation and advances in information technology have made
it easier for manufacturers to bypass distributors and do business directly with consumers.
Distributors have responded to this threat or other destructive acts in a number of different
ways that can be represented through Hirschman’s (1970) Exit-Voice-Loyalty framework.
One additional response that distributors frequently adopt is developing countervailing power
through dependence-balancing actions.  These actions are designed to strengthen bonds with
customers and often manifest themselves in the provision of improved channel services  to
customers.  Does this strategy work?  We seek to address this in our paper.  Specifically, we
examine the nature and magnitude of the direct and interactive effects of (a) the performance
of marketing functions and services by a distributor and (b) the dependence structure of its
relationship with its customers on different dimensions of relationship quality – satisfaction,
trust, commitment and conflict.  Of particular interest to us is the effect of functional
performance on relationship quality in situations characterized by high relative dependence of
the distributor on the customer – this closely approximates the situation that many
distributors, faced by the threat of disintermediation, find themselves in.  Hypotheses from
our model are tested using data collected from the paint industry in the Netherlands and
Belgium.
KEY WORDS: Channel Services; Channel Management; Buyer-Seller Relationships;
Relationship Marketing; Empirical.
2INTRODUCTION
Distributors, across sectors and countries, are faced with the threat of disintermediation.
In many industries, advances in information technology (e.g., the commercial adoption of the
internet and increasing customer access to the web) as well as increased upstream and
downstream consolidation have made it easier for manufacturers and customers to bypass
distributors and do business directly with each other.  Often, such companies are perceived as
having the best business models in their respective industries – e.g., Southwest Airlines in air
travel, Geico in auto insurance and Dell in personal computers.  Recently, InaCom (one of the
world’s largest computer dealers), filed for bankruptcy as many PC manufacturers sought to
emulate Dell by selling directly to consumers and reducing margins for the retail distribution
channel (McWilliams 2000).
In situations where their existence is not threatened, distributors find themselves in a
considerably weakened position, subject to ‘destructive acts’ by other channel members
(Hibbard, Kumar and Stern, 2001).  For example, in the travel industry, a number of airlines
have cut back on commissions offered to travel agents (McDowell 1999) as other, direct
avenues of transacting with end-users gain in popularity.  Distributors have responded to such
destructive acts in a number of different ways – Hibbard, Kumar and Stern (2001) offer a
typology of responses (Disengagement, Constructive Discussion, Passive Acceptance, and
Venting) based on the “Exit, Voice and Loyalty” (ELV) framework proposed by Hirschman
(1970).  This framework has been extensively applied in interpersonal (Rusbult and Zembrodt
1983) and intra-organizational contexts (Rusbult et al. 1988) and has been introduced to the
study of inter-organizational, marketing channel situations by Ping (1993, 1995, and 1997).
Hibbard, Kumar and Stern (2001) found that “passive acceptance” was the only response
that enhanced relationship quality in the manufacturer-dealer dyads that formed the context of
their study.  They note differences between the marketing channels context and the milieu of
3romantic relationships, where the ELV framework had been successfully applied (Rusbult and
Zembrodt 1983).  While this framework may provide a comprehensive typology of responses
to destructive acts in interpersonal relationships, the same may not be true for
interorganizational relationships.  In other words, we are faced with the question – are there
any response options, other than those in the ELV typological framework, available to a
dealer that has been subjected to a destructive act?  Other than “passive acceptance”, is there
anything a dealer can do that would improve its relationship with the manufacturer that
undertook the destructive act?  Is there any dealer response that could not only enhance the
overall quality of the manufacturer-dealer exchange relationship but also strengthen the
dealer’s position in its relationship with the manufacturers?  The answer to all of these
questions may lie in the related notions of “countervailing power” and “dependence
balancing” first advanced by Emerson (1962) and subsequently examined and applied by
Porter (1974), Etgar (1976), Galbraith (1980), Phillips (1981), Heide and John (1988) and
Anderson and Weitz (1989).
Heide and John (1988) view an agent’s offsetting specific investments in key customers
as a device for safeguarding the former’s specific assets in its exchange relationship with
manufacturers.  They found that intermediaries who bonded more closely with their
customers, as a consequence of these offsetting investments, became less dependent on their
suppliers and improved their financial performance.  Clearly, a dealer’s investments in
relationships with customers can play a dependence-balancing role in its relationship with
(powerful) suppliers reducing their vulnerability to destructive actions by the latter.  These
investments would ensure a long-term position in the channel for the dealer (Butaney and
Wortzel 1988).  We posit that it is possible for intermediaries to strengthen bonds with
customers by enhancing relationship quality through a number of different means that may or
4may not entail specific investments.  The key question, then, is how should an intermediary
go about improving the quality of its relationship with its customers?   
Much of the research on relationship quality in the marketing channels literature has
focused on the impact of the (inter)dependence structure of the relationship (e.g. Anderson
and Narus 1990; Brown, Lusch, and Nicholson 1995; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp, 1995)
on relationship quality.  Although the (inter)dependence structure has been found to affect the
quality of the relationship, its effect is relatively small (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995).
This creates a need to identify alternative and additional antecedents of relationship quality.
While the marketing channel literature has paid extensive attention to the factors and
mechanisms that affect the relationship between manufacturers and resellers (e.g., Dwyer,
Schurr, and Oh 1987; Brown, Lusch, and Smith 1991), the focus has been on behavioral
antecedents.  In this paper, we seek to provide additional economic antecedents of
relationship quality.  After all, buyer-seller relationships are economic relationships.  We
focus on the role of channel services and functions performed by the distributor for its
customers.  We report the results of a study of 317 industrial distributor – organizational
customer relationships.  In our study, we take the perspective of the organizational customer
(i.e., a professional painting services provider) and its relationship with its most important
supplying industrial distributor.  Furthermore, we study how the impact of channel function
performance on relationship quality is moderated by the extant dependence structure of the
relationship.  In doing so, we assess the impact of channel function performance on different
dimensions of relationship quality – satisfaction, trust, commitment and conflict under
different dependence structures.
In the remainder of the paper, we first discuss the nature and importance of relationship
quality.  Next, we present theory and hypotheses with respect to the impact of channel
5function performance and dependence structure on relationship quality.  We then describe our
data collection and construct development procedures.  Subsequently, we present our results.
We conclude our paper with a discussion of our findings and their implications.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
We study the impact of a distributor’s channel function performance on relationship
quality and how this impact is moderated by the dependence structure in the relationship. Our
research framework is graphically presented in Figure 1.
[Please Figure 1 About Here]
Relationship Quality
The relationship marketing literature describes a continuum of relationships ranging from
transactional to relational exchanges (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Noordewier, John, and
Nevin 1990).  Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987, p. 13) describe transactional exchanges as
“transactions with a distinct beginning, short duration, and sharp ending by performance,”
and relational exchanges as “exchanges with commencement traces to previous agreements,
longer duration, and reflecting an ongoing process”.  With transactional orientation, it is
unlikely for future exchange between two parties to occur.  In contrast, with relational
orientation, a high likelihood of future interactions exists (Ganesan 1994).
Long-term and high-quality relationships, characterized by frequent interactions between
different members of a distribution channel, offer advantages for both sellers and buyers.  For
sellers, they offer the benefits of creating exit barriers for their customers (Andaleeb 1996),
leveraging limited resources through joint efforts with customers, gaining benefits from
customer ideas and experiences (Anderson and Narus 1991), and improving capacity planning
6(Han, Wilson, and Dant 1993).  For the customer, a long-term relationship with a supplier
reduces stress and risks, solves initial problems, and leads to the accommodation of special
needs. The customer learns what to expect (Bitner 1995) and the reliability of supply
increases (Han, Wilson, Dant 1993).
High levels of satisfaction, trust, and commitment, and low levels of conflict are
important characteristics of long-term, high-quality relationships (e.g., Anderson and Narus
1990; Coleman and Robicheaux 1994; Morgan and Hunt 1994).  Indeed, a number of recent
empirical studies have viewed relationship quality as a combination of some or all of these
constructs (Dwyer and Oh 1989; Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp 1995; Jap 2001; Hibbard,
Kumar and Stern 2001).  Satisfaction is typically defined as the appraisal of a firm’s working
relationship with another firm (Anderson and Narus 1990; Geyskens, Steenkamp, Kumar
1999).  Satisfaction plays an important role in relationships and has been found to be
instrumental in increasing cooperation between channel partners, and leading to fewer
terminations of relationships (Ganesan 1994).  Trust is widely recognized as an essential
dimension of relationship quality (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Garbarino and Johnson 1999;
Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1998).  A frequently used definition of trust is the
perceived credibility and benevolence of the partner (Ganesan 1994; Kumar, Scheer, and
Steenkamp 1995).  Trust in the partner’s credibility is the belief that the partner stands by its
word, fulfills promised role obligations, and is sincere, and trust in the partner’s benevolence
is the belief that the partner is interested in the firm’s welfare and will not take unexpected
actions that will negatively affect the firm (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995).
Commitment, similar to trust, is viewed as an essential indicator of relationship quality
(Morgan and Hunt 1994; Wilson 1995; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999). Anderson
and Weitz (1992, p. 19) define commitment as “a desire to develop a stable relationship, a
willingness to make short-term sacrifices to maintain the relationship, and a confidence in the
7stability of the relationship.”  Commitment is enduring and reflects a positive valuation of a
relationship (Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpandé 1992).  Finally, Conflict implies a level of
tension, frustration, and disagreement in the relationship due to one party obstructing the
other party in reaching its goal (Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999).  Despite the fact
that channel conflicts can be functional (Coughlan, Anderson, Stern, and El-Ansary 2001), in
general higher levels of conflict will indicate lower relationship quality.
Antecedents of Relationship Quality
Given the importance of long-term, high-quality relationships, it is not surprising that
much research has been conducted on the antecedents of these relationships.  One of the most
extensively investigated antecedents of relationship quality in the marketing channels
literature is (inter)dependence (e.g. Anderson and Narus 1990; Brown, Lusch, and Nicholson
1995; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp, 1995; Lusch and Brown 1996). In general dependence
asymmetry between channel partners has been found to be detrimental for relationship quality
while high total interdependence stimulates relationship quality.  However, as noted by
Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp (1995), these two interdependence constructs explain only a
very small percentage of variance in the dimensions of relationship quality studied by them –
namely, trust, commitment and conflict.  Therefore, they call for the identification of
additional antecedents to fully explain variations in different dimensions of relationship
quality.
We propose functional or economic antecedents to explain the development of
relationship quality.  The impact of such variables on relationship quality has received
substantially less attention than behavioral antecedents.  For example, the performance of
marketing functions by a reseller is rarely examined as an antecedent of long-term
relationships with customers, although the existence of resellers is primarily justified because
8they perform these functions (Alderson 1954; Alderson and Martin 1967; Bucklin, 1966).  By
performing marketing functions in a superior way, the quality of the relationship between
resellers and their customers can be improved.  Berry and Gresham (1986) state that good
service is necessary to retain client relationships.  In this study, we investigate the impact of
behavioral as well as economic variables.
The Distributor’s Role: Performing Marketing Channel Functions
Channel intermediaries are independent businesses that assist producers, manufacturers
and final users in the performance of distribution tasks.  They exist because, as specialists in
the performance of distribution tasks, they operate at higher levels of effectiveness and
efficiency (Rosenbloom 1997; Coughlan, Anderson, Stern, and El-Ansary 2001) than
manufacturers or end-users.  Rosenbloom (1987) identifies six distribution tasks that an
intermediary performs for customers – (a) making the product available; (b) delivering
customer service; (c) providing credit and financial assistance; (d) assortment convenience;
(e) breaking bulk; and (f) giving advice and technical support.  It is logical to assume that the
quality of the performance of these distribution functions will be positively related to
relationship quality.  Indeed, drawing on Social Exchange Theory (Thibaut and Kelley 1959),
one could posit that the effective performance of marketing functions would raise the
comparison level of the focal reseller relative to the comparison level of alternatives.
Organizational customers will be satisfied with good financial conditions, a convenient
assortment, good location features, clear information, and friendly personnel and will not look
to replace their reseller.  Rather, they will be motivated to develop trust and increase
commitment as well as not engage in dysfunctional conflicts, in order to build and sustain a
long-term relationship with the reseller.  Relationship marketing theory also contends that
organizations that deliver superior benefits will be highly valued and that partners will
9commit themselves to establishing, developing, and maintaining relationships with such
parties (Morgan and Hunt 1994).  Conversely, when the performance of marketing functions
is insufficient, the customers will experience a decrease in relationship quality.  We
hypothesize:
H1: As the performance level of the marketing functions executed by the distributor
increases, the organizational customer’s satisfaction with, trust in, and
commitment to the distributor will increase and the extent of channel conflict
will decrease.
(Inter) dependence Structure
The interdependence structure of a dyadic relationship refers to the (relative) dependence
of the two parties on each other (Emerson 1962; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995).  Two
dimensions of dependence can be distinguished.  Total interdependence is the sum of both
parties’ dependencies on each other while interdependence asymmetry refers to the difference
between each party’s dependence on the other.  This difference has also been referred to as
the more dependent party’s relative dependence (Anderson and Narus 1990) or the less
dependent party’s relative power (Frazier and Rody 1991).  Being dependent leads to the need
to maintain a relationship with another organization to achieve its goals (Frazier 1983; Heide
and John 1988).
When customers see their reseller as being highly dependent on them, they have little
motivation to develop a long-term relationship (Ganesan 1994; Lusch and Brown 1996).  This
explains why relationships that are asymmetrical in dependence and power have been found
to be less stable, less trusting, and more dysfunctional (Anderson and Weitz 1989).  The more
powerful firm does not need not to develop a high-quality relationship, because it can use its
relative power to obtain its partner’s cooperation (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995).
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Furthermore, the relatively dependent party will expect to be exploited and/ or attacked
regardless of its own behavior and, therefore, it is most likely to engage in dysfunctional
behavior (Lawler, Ford, and Blegen 1988).  Thus, when a reseller is dependent on its
industrial customers, the satisfaction, trust, and commitment of the customer will tend to be
lower, and the conflict level in the relationship will be higher.
Symmetric interdependence exists when both parties are equally dependent on each other.
In such a situation both parties will have equal access to resources that are valued by their
partner.  When total interdependence is high, both parties have a high stake in ensuring the
relationship’s success (Buchanan 1992).  Both parties face relatively high exit barriers, so
they have a strong motivation to build, maintain, and strengthen the relationship (Kumar,
Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995).  When resellers and industrial customers are mutually
dependent, they will thus have an interest in improving the relationship quality.  Thus, higher
total interdependency will cause higher customers’ satisfaction, trust, and commitment and
lower conflict.  We hypothesize:
H2: As the relative dependence of the distributor on its organizational customer increases,
the customer’s satisfaction with, trust in, and commitment to the distributor will
decrease and the extent of channel conflict will increase.
H3: As the total interdependence between the distributor and its organizational customer
increases, the customer’s satisfaction with, trust in, and commitment to the
distributor will increase and the extent of channel conflict will decrease.
Interaction of Channel Function Performance and Interdependence
High relative dependence of the distributor decreases the motivation of customer to
improve the relationship.  The distributor will be more vulnerable to opportunistic or
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destructive behavior by the customer.  In such a situation, the effective performance of
channel functions by the distributor can safeguard against dysfunctional behavior and thereby
be especially positive for the relationship quality.  In addition, it may lead to dependence
balancing and a subsequent increase in interdependence, which may have a positive effect on
the relationship quality.
In a situation with high total interdependence, both parties are motivated to develop,
maintain, and improve the relationship.  The presence of these incentives will magnify the
effect of actions taken by the distributor to improve relationship quality.  Thus, the
performance of marketing functions by the reseller will have a stronger impact on relationship
quality when the total interdependence is high.  We hypothesize:
H4: The impact of the distributor’s marketing functions performance on the
organizational customer’s satisfaction with, trust in, and commitment to the
distributor and on the extent of channel conflict will be stronger if the relative
dependence of the distributor is higher.
H5: The impact of the distributor’s marketing functions performance on the
organizational customer’s satisfaction with, trust in, and commitment to the
distributor and on the extent of channel conflict will be stronger if the total
interdependence between distributor and customer is higher.
METHODOLOGY
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a mail survey among professional painters (buyers)
in the Netherlands and Belgium (the Dutch speaking part only).  A questionnaire consisting of
multiple-item scales was developed to measure the painters’ scores on a set of constructs. Our
final sample consisted of 317 painters (233 Dutch and 94 Flemish) out of 1500 painter names.
This meant a response rate of 21.1%.
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Before responding to the multiple-item scales, painters were requested to identify their
most important distributor (seller).  This was the distributor where the painter bought most of
his/her paints (in terms of the monetary value of purchases).  These relationships are likely to
be ones where the painter is very involved in the relationship.  We expected this to have a
positive impact on the quality of the answers.  No control upon the selection of the specific
distributor was imposed.  Although this approach might potentially have decreased the
amount of variation of the (inter) dependencies in the relationships in our data, analyses
showed that our data on the dependence-structure constructs still contained substantial
variation and were not extremely skewed.
Measures
Our research model broadly consists of three sets of constructs.  These concern (1)
distributor channel function performance, (2) (inter) dependence, and (3) relationship quality.
We measured these constructs using multiple-item scales.  The exact wording of the items
used in these scales can be found in the Appendix.
Marketing Channel Functions Performance
We measured how distributors performed marketing channel functions by using customer
ratings on five dimensions.  These dimensions were determined by applying a two-step
procedure.  First, we took Rosenbloom’s (1987) taxonomy of distributor functions and
determined which of these would be relevant for the specific setting in which we collected
our data.  The relevance and applicability of these functions for the specific channel we
conducted our study in (e.g., for paint products) was determined after discussions with
experts within the channel.  Next, we developed a list of specific items reflecting important
functions performed by paint distributors.  Applying a principal-component factor analysis
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uncovered the following five key functions performed by distributors for their customers.
These are:
(a) Location refers to spatial convenience and accessibility of the distributor’s outlet.
(b) Assortment refers to both the depth and breadth of the distributor’s assortment.
(c) Financial and Price-Setting Policies refers to price setting policies, financial conditions
and credit arrangements as offered by the distributor.
(d) (Promotional) Information refers to both promotional information and information about
products and how to use them.
(e) Personnel Services refers to the quality and competency of distributor personnel and the
services they deliver.
Next, we used LISREL 8.3 (Jöreskög and Sörbom 1993) to assess the quality of the five
channel function constructs.  The average value of the factor loadings was .74.  These
findings support the convergent validity of the items.  The correlations between the five
dimensions were moderate (between .50 and .69) but significantly different from 1.  This
provides evidence for discriminant validity of the five separate dimensions.  The Cronbach
alpha reliabilities of the first-order factors range from .69 to .89.  Since the correlation
between the five dimensions was relatively high, we also specified a second-order factor
model with the five dimensions discussed above as the first-order factors and channel
function performance as second-order factor.  The chi-square for this model is 344.43
(p<.001). The comparative fit index is 0.92, above the generally accepted level of .90.  All
first-order and second-order factor loadings are highly significant (minimum t-value is 6.90,
p<.001 and most t-values are above 9.00) and larger than 0.57. The average value of the
second-order factor loadings was .77.  Given the quality of this model, we developed one
channel function performance construct by first developing scores for the five separate
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dimensions (through computing the arithmetic mean of individual item scores) and, next,
computing an unweighted average of the scores on the five dimensions.
Dependence Structure
The dependence structure in the relationship between the distributor and the customer
was defined using the relative dependence and total interdependence constructs.  The values
of these constructs were computed based on the measured values of distributor and customer
dependence.  Distributor and customer dependence were measured using items from scales
used by Lusch and Brown (1996).  Distributor Dependence refers to the dependence of the
distributor on the informant’s organization and how it would hurt profits to lose this
organization as a customer.  Customer Dependence refers to the dependence of the
informant’s organization, that is the organizational customer, on the distributor and how it
would hurt business not being able to do business any longer with the distributor.
Measure Validation
We specified a two-factor model with one factor representing the distributor’s
dependence construct and the other factor representing the organizational customer’s
dependence construct.  Both constructs were measured using three items.  The chi-square of
this model was 50.58 (p<.001).  The comparative fit index was 0.94.  All factor loadings were
significant (minimum t-value was 10.03, p<.001 and most t-values were above 12.00) and
larger than 0.59. The average factor loading was .81 for the distributor dependence construct
and .72 for the customer dependence construct.  These findings support the convergent
validity of the items (.89).  Distributor dependence and customer dependence were then
determined by computing the arithmetic means of the item scores.  Note that, in keeping with
the approach employed in extant research (e.g., Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995),
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Distributor Relative Dependence is computed by subtracting the distributor’s dependence
score from the customer’s dependence score and Total Interdependence is computed by
adding the distributor’s and the customer’ dependence score.
Relationship Quality:
The quality of the relationship between the distributor and the organizational customer was
measured as the customer’s satisfaction with, trust in, and commitment to the relationship,
and the level of conflict in the relationship.  In measuring the constructs, we used existing and
established scales.  Items from these scales were used if they were appropriate and relevant in
the context where we conducted our study in.
Satisfaction was measured as the customer’s overall satisfaction with the performance of
the distributor.  We used items from scales used by MacIntosh and Lockshin (1997) and
Sirohi, Mclaughlin, and Wittink (1998) to measure satisfaction.
Trust was measured as the customer’s trust in the distributor’s honesty and reliability.
Our scale was composed of items from scales used by Siguaw, Simpson, and Baker (1998)
and Doney and Cannon (1997).
Commitment was measured as the customer’s willingness to keep buying and stay a
customer for the distributor.  To measure this construct we used items from scales used by
Siguaw, Simpson, and Baker (1998), Sirohi, McLaughlin and Wittink (1998), and Geyskens,
Steenkamp, Scheer, and Kumar (1996).
Conflict was measured as the amount of antagonism in the relationship between the
customer and the distributor.  This construct was measured with items from the scale used by
Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995).
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Measure Validation
We specified a four-factor model with the four factors representing the four relationship
constructs – satisfaction, trust, commitment, and conflict.  The chi-square of this model was
175.36 (p<.001). The comparative fit index was 0.96.  All factor loadings were significant
(minimum t-value was 6.36, p<.001 and most t-values were above 13.00) and larger than
0.41. The average factor loading for the satisfaction construct was .68, for the trust construct
.72, for the conflict construct .86, and for the commitment construct .59.  These findings
support the convergent validity of the items.  The constructs were moderately to highly
correlated with the absolute correlation coefficients ranging from .48 to .87. However, all
correlation coefficients were significantly different from unity, showing discriminant validity.
The values for all relationship quality constructs were developed by computing
unweighted averages of the informants’ item ratings.  Table 1 contains descriptive statistics
for the constructs and correlations between them.
[Please Insert Table 1 About Here]
RESULTS
Our hypotheses were tested by performing regression analyses.  Equation 1 presents the
framework we applied for our analyses.
17
Relationship Quality = β0 + β1 * Channel Functions Performance + β2 * Distributor
Relative Dependence + β3 * Total Interdependence + β4 *
Interaction 1 (Channel Function Performance * Distributor
Relative Dependence) + β5 * Interaction 2 (Channel Function
Performance * Total Interdependence) + ε (1)
We performed four regression analyses, i.e., one for each of the four relationship quality
variables.  To avoid multicollinearity problems, we mean-centered the values of the channel
function performance, the relative dependence, and the total interdependence constructs.  This
procedure ensures that the scores on these constructs become uncorrelated with the mutual
interaction terms (Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan 1990).
The results of the regression analyses are presented in Table 2
[Please Insert Table 2 About Here]
The results in Table 2 show that in relationships in which the distributor effectively performs
marketing channel functions, the organizational customer perceives quality of the relationship
as being better.  Greater satisfaction, trust, and commitment and lower levels of conflict
between the distributor and customer characterize relationships in which channel functions
are performed better.  This finding confirms H1.
Next, we find that relationships in which the distributor is relatively dependent on its
customer are perceived less favorably by the customer, compared to relationships in which
the distributor is less dependent.  Distributor dependence leads to lower satisfaction, trust,
and commitment and a higher level of channel conflict.  This finding confirms H2.
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Furthermore, it is striking that although the effect of relative dependence is significant, it is
clearly less substantial than the effect of channel functions performance.  Distributors can
thus compensate for the negative effects of a relatively dependent position on relationship
quality by providing superior channel function performance.
As hypothesized in H3, relationships in which the distributor and its customer are highly
interdependent are characterized by higher customer trust and customer commitment.
Surprisingly, however, they are also characterized by significantly higher levels of channel
conflict.  Apparently, interactions that are perceived as dysfunctional by the customer occur
more frequently when the two parties are highly dependent on each other.  This may happen
because, when both parties are highly dependent on each other, there is a greater likelihood of
each party’s behavior obstructing the other from achieving its goals.  Exchange relationships
with high levels of interdependence are often characterized by the presence of exit barriers
and high switching costs.  In these circumstances, with both parties locked in, relationships
are unlikely to be terminated and unhappiness with the behavior of the other party is
manifested through conflicts.  It should be noted, though, that such conflicts do not
necessarily need to have negative long-term consequences and can even become functional.
When we look at the interaction between channel function performance and relative
dependence, we find a positive and significant interaction between function performance and
relative distributor dependence, in terms of impact on customer satisfaction and commitment.
No effect is found for customer trust and channel conflict.  Thus, H4 is partially confirmed.
Performing channel functions effectively is especially important for improving customer
satisfaction and commitment in relationships in which the distributors are relatively
dependent.
Finally, we study the effects of interaction between channel function performance and
total interdependence.  No relationship between the interaction and customer satisfaction or
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trust is found.  However, relationships in which distributors perform well with respect to
channel functions are more likely to yield substantially greater customer commitment and
fewer channel conflicts if the distributor and the customer are highly interdependent.  Here,
the results with respect to conflict are interesting.  Together with the main effect of
interdependence on conflict, this result  suggests that, in highly interdependent relationships,
there is substantial potential for conflicts to arise because goal attainment is highly dependent
on the partner’s actions.  However, if the distributor performs its channel functions
appropriately, there is a substantial reduction in the actual level of relationship conflicts since
such performance allows the customer to reach its goals.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have studied the impact of distributor channel function performance on
relationship quality in the distributor-customer dyad.  We view this strengthening of
distributor-customer bonds as a mechanism for dependence-balancing in manufacturer-
distributor relationships.  For distributors, the importance of undertaking actions that facilitate
dependence-balancing is reinforced by the finding that there are very few response
alternatives to manufacturer-generated destructive acts that do not harm relationship quality
(Hibbard, Kumar and Stern, 2001). Our results show that distributors can improve their
relationships (and strengthen bonds) with organizational customers by performing their
channel functions effectively.  Notably, the effective performance of channel functions has a
particularly pronounced effect on customer satisfaction and commitment when the distributor
is relatively dependent on the customer – a scenario that is found with greater frequency in an
era of disintermediation and buyer consolidation.
A clear managerial implication of our study is that embattled distributors, when faced
with destructive acts or the threat of disintermediation, need not limit their response to the
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Exit-Voice-Loyalty framework originally proposed by Hirschman (1970) and further
developed by others.  Instead, these distributors should focus on effectively performing
channel functions, as a means of salvaging and strengthening relationships with customers.
Heide and John (1988) have shown that offsetting specific investments in distributor-
customer relationships can balance the dependence structure in supplier-distributor
relationships by strengthening bonds with customers.  Our study shows that performing
channel functions effectively can have a similar effect of enhancing relationships with
customers.  The managerial implications of our results are somewhat more mixed for
upstream channel members.  They are presented with a dilemma, in terms of the type of
distributor to be selected – should they choose a distributor who may expand the size of the
pie, even if it means a reduced share of the pie for the manufacturer?  In order to maximize
the quality of channel services delivered and be competitive against other suppliers, a supplier
is likely to prefer working with distributors that effectively perform channel functions.  At the
same time, these distributors are more likely to develop good exchange relationships and
bond with customers, thereby shifting the power balance between supplier and distributor in
favor of the latter.
Our study makes important theoretical contributions to the literature on relationships in
marketing channels.  Compared with the impact of the often-investigated construct of
dependence structure, the impact of channel function performance on relationship quality is
relatively large.  This result addresses the gap in explaining variations in different dimensions
of relationship quality (highlighted by Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp, 1995).  It also
highlights the role of economic variables (in addition to behavioral variables) as antecedents
of relationship quality and other key marketing channel constructs.
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While our empirical results largely confirm our hypotheses, H3, H4 and H5 are only
partially supported.  Moreover, our results for the effects of total interdependence on conflict
are not similar to those obtained by Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp (1995).  While they found
that higher total interdependence was associated with lower levels of conflict, we found the
reverse to be the case.  In our study the main effect of total interdependence on conflict was
positive.  The explanation for this may be lie some of the consequences of high
interdependence.  Under conditions of high interdependence, goal attainment is more likely to
be contingent on partner in the relationship, creating greater potential for the obstruction of
the goal and consequent conflict.  Moreover, conditions of high interdependence often result
in both parties being locked into a relationship.  In such situations, each party is more tolerant
of opportunistic behavior by the other (Wathne and Heide 2000) and accepts consequent
higher levels of conflict.  In terms of the interaction between channel function performance
and total interdependence, our results clearly indicate that high-quality channel function
performance is critical for high-quality relationships between buyers and sellers.  Indeed, if
the distributor performs these functions adequately, it is likely to facilitate goal attainment by
the partner and negate the effect of high interdependence on conflict.  This, again, stresses the
importance of channel function performance for buyer-seller relationships.
Our results, when taken together with those of Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp (1995),
suggest the need for further investigation of variables that mediate or moderate the
relationship between interdependence and relationship quality.  This could include variables
from TCA, such as the magnitude and nature of relationship-specific investments made by
each party, as well as more traditional behavioral constructs – e.g., the punitive capabilities of
each party (Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp 1998), the extent to which coercive influence
strategies are used (Gundlach and Cadotte 1994), cognitions and attributions about each
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party’s actions (Hibbard, Kumar and Stern 2001) or the structure of the buyer-seller
relationship (Cannon and Perreault, Jr. 1999). This presents an excellent opportunity for
future research.
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APPENDIX: MEASUREMENT SCALES
Marketing Channel Function Performance
(very bad 0-1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10 very good)
Location
1. Location, accessibility
2. Parking facilities
3. Opening hours
α = 0.69
Assortment
1. The number of brands
2. The number of painting products per brand
3. The number of non-paint products
α = 0.76
Financial and Price-Setting Policies
1. Price level
2. Price – quality relationship
3. Financial conditions, credit arrangements, discounts
α = 0.81
(Promotional) Information
1. Special offers
2. Instructional information with new products
3. Technical information and brochures
α = 0.85
Personnel
1. Expertise, competency
2. Correctness of deliveries
3. Speed of in-store services
4. Customer friendliness
5. Relationship management reputation
6. Continuity of personnel occupation
α = 0.89
Mean Overall Scale = 7.78 (1.02)
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Dependence of Industrial Distributor (completely disagree 1-2-3-4-5 completely agree)
1. This distributor is dependent on us
2. It is difficult for this distributor to replace us
3. It would be costly for this distributor to lose us as a customer
α = 0.85, Mean = 2.17 (1.11)
Dependence of Organizational Customer (completely disagree 1-2-3-4-5 completely agree)
1. We are dependent on this distributor
2. It is difficult to replace this customer
3. It would be costly to lose this distributor
α = 0.75, Mean = 2.24 (1.03)
Customer Satisfaction with Industrial Distributor (completely disagree 1-2-3-4-5 completely
agree)
1. This distributor delivers value for the money we pay
2. When I leave this distributor’s outlet, I am satisfied
3. This distributor can improve a lot (R)
4. Generally, I feel satisfied with this distributor
α = 0.77, Mean = 3.99 (0.64)
Customer Trust (completely disagree 1-2-3-4-5 completely agree)
1. This distributor is open and honest with us
2. This distributor is knowledgeable about its products
3. In difficult times this distributor will support us
4. This distributor is reliable
α = 0.81, Mean = 4.18 (0.66)
Customer Commitment (completely disagree 1-2-3-4-5 completely agree)
1. We are constantly looking for another distributor to buy our materials from (R)
2. We have a good relationship with this distributor and want to keep buying from them
3. We will continue buying our paints from this distributor
4. The quantity of paints we buy from this distributor will grow in the coming years
α = 0.66, Mean = 4.19 (0.63)
Channel Conflicts (completely disagree 1-2-3-4-5 completely agree)
1. The relationship with this distributor is full of conflicts
2. Negotiations with this distributor are always rough
3. We often differ of opinion with this distributor
4. We do get frustrated with the way this distributor works
α = 0.92, Mean = 1.56 (0.82)
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Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Coefficients
Channel
Functions
Distributor
Dependence
Customer
Dependence
Customer
Satisfaction
Customer
Trust
Customer
Commitment
Channel
Conflicts
Correlations
Distributor Dependence
Customer Dependence
Customer Satisfaction
Customer Trust
Customer Commitment
Channel Conflicts
Means
Standard Deviations
-.092
(.108)
  .181
(.001)
  .606
(.000)
  .548
(.000)
  .383
(.000)
-.334
(.000)
7.781
1.016
  .266
(.000)
-.221
(.000)
-.087
(.000)
-.054
(.342)
  .263
(.000)
2.173
1.109
  .221
(.000)
  .273
(.000)
  .273
(.000)
  .000
(.000)
2.242
1.027
  .598
(.000)
  .497
(.000)
-.433
(.000)
3.985
 .6403
  .561
(.000)
-.424
(.000)
4.176
 .663
-.401
(.000)
4.190
 .630
1.560
 .820
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Table 2
Results of Regression Analyses:
The Effects of the Performance of Marketing Channel Functions and (Inter)Dependence on Relationship Quality
Beta Coefficients (Significance)
Customer
Satisfaction
Customer
Trust
Customer
Commitment
Channel
Conflict
Distributor Channel Functions Performance
Distributor Relative Dependence
Total Interdependence
Interaction 1
(Channel Functions * Relative Dependence)
Interaction 2
(Channel Functions * Total Interdependence)
R2
F (Sig)
  .554 (.000)
-.241 (.000)
-.016 (.713)
  .098 (.024)
  .018 (.682)
.429
47.076 (.000)
  .498 (.000)
-.178 (.000)
  .100 (.038)
  .058 (.218)
-.010 (.836)
.319
29.706 (.000)
  .307 (.000)
-.196 (.000)
  .120 (.022)
  .082 (.110)
  .112 (.033)
.195
15.876 (.000)
-.279 (.000)
  .139 (.011)
  .178 (.001)
-.014 (.787)
-.121 (.025)
.158
12.454 (.000)
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